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Abstract
We estimate the causal effect of Internet on volume of trade in a major distributed mar-
ketplace. From 1997 to 2007, a period during which residential Internet use tripled, Internet
increased the volume of used cars traded in California by 7.2 percent. This implies a substantial
welfare gain due to reductions in market frictions of approximately $43 million per year relative
to 1997 Internet penetration levels. These gains are likely attributable to search and matching
cost reductions and increased symmetry of information availability across buyers and sellers.
Intriguingly, the effect is stronger in thick markets and urban areas, implying that Internet
may help to diminish choice overload. Our results suggest that policies promoting broadband
Internet deployment may enhance efficiency.
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21 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to estimate the efficiency gains from the availability of Internet in a large
and active decentralized trading market: the market for used automobiles in California. Access
to the Internet drastically reduces the cost of acquiring information, and this potentially improves
several aspects of the market. Buyers and sellers can search for each other and be matched with
unprecedented ease. Internet may also reduce asymmetries in information between buyers and
sellers, helping to overcome the well-known problems associated with adverse selection. Overall,
improved access to information can allow more of the potential gains from trade to be realized.
These possibilities are especially relevant today in light of the extraordinary growth in online
marketplaces (e.g. eBay and Amazon.com)1, as well as online resources that support all forms of
trade (e.g. CarFax, Autobytel, Angie’s List).
Much of the existing empirical literature on the impact of Internet focuses on changes in the level
and distribution of prices.2 Such analyses are generally concerned with consumer welfare rather
than joint surplus (though some also derive implications about the nature of competition). Our
aim in this study is to shed light on the magnitude of total welfare gains, making volume-of-trade
the relevant economic outcome variable of interest. The empirical literature examining Internet’s
effect on transaction volume is sparse, and a main contribution of this study is add a credible data
point from an important market.3
The used car market has many features that make it an appealing setting for our analysis. In
addition to being very large and active, it is also a market where transaction costs are high and
1An ever-increasing volume of goods is now traded in decentralized markets. In 2008, nearly $60 billion of goods
were transacted on eBay, and Amazon.com had $20 billion in total revenue.
2Examples include Brown and Goolsbee (2002) on life insurance, Orlov (2011) on airline fares, and Zettelmeyer
et al (2006) on car transactions.
3Dana and Orlov (2009) examine the Internet effect on airline capacity utilization, and Ghose et al (2006) study
the market for used books.
3information is costly to acquire4 and often asymmetric, with potential buyers trying to assess
unobserved quality that is known to the seller. Over the last 15 years, several Internet-based
resources have emerged in the industry. Some retailers use the Internet as a their primary customer
acquisition channel (e.g. carmax.com, autotrader.com, carsdirect.com). Referral services such as
autobytel.com help to direct consumers to low-cost oﬄine retailers.5 The Internet is also a platform
for several purely information-based resources. The most relevant is carfax.com, which provides
vehicle history reports on used cars and is has all but eliminated the information gap between
buyers and sellers. Moreover, the possibility of gathering more information and reaching a broader
number of buyers/sellers has substantially increases the surplus generated upon trade.
The mechanism at work is the following: the market is characterized by prospective buyers and sell-
ers that enter into a costly, two-sided search and matching process. Consumers have heterogeneous
preferences over product attributes, in our case automobile characteristics. Hence, a given car has
different appeal to different consumers (as emphasized by the empirical literature starting with
Berry at al. 1995). Therefore the availability of more information and a broader market reduces
search costs and favors better matches (i.e. generates matches with higher joint surplus).6 Each of
the aforementioned potential mechanisms by which Internet would effect a decentralized market–
decreased search costs, improved match quality, and less adverse selection7–would be similar in at
least one important way: they would each increase volume of trade.
In order to test this hypothesis empirically, we assemble and analyze a detailed dataset that in-
cludes county-level Internet penetration and used car registration and transaction counts during
the period 1997-2007 in California. These data allow us to exploit three main sources of variation:
4Porter and Sattler (1999) and Gavazza, Lizzeri and Roketskiy (2012) reports transaction costs that range between
15-50% of the trade-in value of the used cars in US.
5Zettelmeyer et al (2006).
6A similar framework has been use in Ngail and Tenreyro (2010) to study the housing market.
7Lewis (2011) shows that used-car sellers are able to partially contract on the quality of their goods by disclosing
private information on the webpage, i.e. by posting text, photos, etc. He shows that woluntarily disclosure of private
information on the web helps to protect the buyer from adverse selection.
4(1) differences in Internet penetration over time; (2) differences in Internet penetration across ge-
ographical locations; (3) differences in the counts of registered and sold cars across counties and
over time. This variation allows us to estimate the marginal effects of Internet penetration on
trade volume using a continuous difference-in-differences approach. We account for the possibility
of within-county correlation by clustering standard errors at the county level.
We also explicitly address concerns about the endogeneity of the vehicle stock as a right-hand-side
variable in the trade volume regressions. Our estimates would be biased if, for example, leakage of
used cars across county boundaries is correlated with changes in Internet penetration. We use an
array of instrumental variables to address this concern, and discuss our approach in detail in the
section on empirical evidence.
Our results show evidence of substantial efficiency gains in the used car market due to the Internet.
In California, Internet penetration increased by 28 percentage points (from 14 to 42 percent) from
1997 to 2007. Our estimates imply that over 120,000 additional used car transactions occurred
state-wide in 2007 than would have occurred had Internet stayed at 1997 levels. This is an increase
in the resale ratio of 7.2 percent. Further, the specifications that we employ allow price to vary
along the equilibrium path. Thus, these results should be interpreted as general equilibrium changes
in quantity. The magnitude of Internet’s impact on volume of trade in this market is meaningful.
The 7.2 percent increase in trade volume implies a lower-bound welfare gain from transaction and
search cost reductions of $25 per unit traded (relative to the 1997 Internet levels). Across the entire
state of California, this translates into an annual welfare gain of $43 million.
Previous studies suggest that market thickness–the density of potential buyers and sellers–will be
an important feature of our setting.8 We confirm both that transaction volume increases in the
8For example, Gavazza (2010) studies a decentralized market for used aircraft (which is also characterized by
two-sided search), and shows that an increasing returns-to-scale matching function increases the probability of a
meeting and trade when the number of potential buyers and sellers is high. In his empirical results, he finds that
thicker markets result in higher transaction frequencies.
5size of the vehicle fleet, and that important differences exist between rural and urban areas. Urban
areas exhibit more used car transactions, even after conditioning on market thickness. Further,
the Internet increases trade more in urban areas than rural. Together, these results imply that
subsidies for Internet will yield higher benefit in urban areas than in rural areas (at least with
respect to the functioning of decentralized markets).
The present paper builds on a growing literature that examines the role of transaction costs in the
second-hand market for durable goods. Several studies develop theoretical frameworks to investigate
patterns in asset allocation and trade in secondary markets.9 Others choose a calibration approach
in which certain key parameters (e.g. transaction costs) may be perturbed, and predicted model
counterfactuals observed along the equilibrium path.10 Two empirical contributions are particularly
relevant. Porter and Sattler (1999) estimate the role of asset depreciation on trade volume, with
a particular focus on the role of age of the durable good. They find that patterns of trade in the
used car market are consistent with an important role for transaction costs, but fit the adverse
selection model less well. Schiraldi (2011) develops structural model that can be estimated to
retrieve the actual magnitude of transaction costs, and confirms that they must be very large in
order to rationalize the observed persistence of car ownership. These papers support the hypothesis
that higher transaction costs and frictions in the secondary market lead to lower volume of trade.
A separate economic literature exists on the effect of Internet on the operation of markets.11 These
studies mainly focus on the price of (new) goods, both in terms of level and dispersion. A few papers
also show that Internet facilitates better matching between products and consumer tastes, as in
the present work.12 In light of these two full and important strands of literature, our contribution
may be viewed as a purely empirical effort that exploits exogenous variation in transaction costs to
9See, for example, Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Schiraldi and Nava (2011).
10These papers include Stolyarov (2002), Chen et al (2012), and Gavazza et al (2012).
11See Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Ellison and Ellison (2005), Orlov (2011),
Zettelmeyer et al (2006).
12Examples include Scott Morton (2005), Brynjolfsson et al (2003) and Ghose et al (2006).
6examine market outcomes. Underpinning our empirical strategy is the exogeneity of the availability
of Internet technology with respect to the individual used car buyer and seller.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe a theoretical framework that captures some
of the important features of our setting, including search costs and match-specific quality. We then
test hypotheses against data from the California used car market, and those data are presented in
Section 3. We discuss the results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The empirical focus is on the state of California between the years 1997 and 2007. California is
the most populous state in the US, with a population of nearly 32 million in the year 2000. It was
also the frontier of the high technology boom that yielded many of the computing and Internet
technologies that are now commonplace in the US. As we will show, the decade spanned by our data
is characterized by rapid consumer adoption of Internet at home. Annual automobile purchases
over the same period increased from nearly 1 million in 1997 to 2 million in 2007, or roughly one car
for every 18 people. To investigate the relationship between Internet penetration and automobile
transactions, we combine data from several sources.
The cross-sectional unit of interest in this study is the county, and each variable ultimately appears
at the county-year level. Car registration and transaction counts were acquired from R.L. Polk,
which gathers these data from the California Department of Motor Vehicles. An observation is the
total number of cars for each make-model-year that are registered or transacted in a given year, by
county. These include both new and used cars, the latter of which may be either dealer or private
transactions. We augment these data with car characteristics, which were acquired from Wards
Automotive’s Automotive Yearbook. New and used car prices were available at the state level by
Ward’s and the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), respectively.13 From the R.L.
13Theoretical predictions are clearer for volume of trade than for price, and in any case these are not terribly useful
7Polk dataset, for each make-model-year we observe the stock and transaction of all cars of each
type in each time period t. The stock of cars available of each type k in period t provides a measure
of the “thickness”, or size, of the market for each model in a given year.
In this study, we postulate that services provided via the Internet serve to lower transaction costs
in the used car market. As such, residential Internet penetration is the explanatory variable of
interest in this study. We hypothesize that widespread use of the Internet by both buyers and
sellers decreases the costs associated with buying and selling cars, in particular used cars. Figure
(1) displays graphs of Internet penetration for each county in the sample.14 We obtained county-
by-year Internet penetration from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplement Files. We
consider a household to be an Internet user if they respond “yes” to the question “Use Internet at
Home?” and any of the similar Internet access questions. These questions appear in the CPS in a
subset of years from 1997 to 2007.15
Table (1) provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.16 We present
statistics for three years of data: 1997, 2003, and 2007. These data reveal a clear increase in the
annual number of used cars owned and sold between 1997 and 2007. While it is not shown directly
here, the 70 percent increase in the stock of registered used cars, along with a near doubling of the
number of distinct models, reflect an increase in the overall quantity of new cars purchased. This
explains why, despite the number of used car transactions increasing over these years, the volume of
when implementing a county-level analysis.
14While one might expect Internet penetration to increase monotonically over time, our data show some non-
monotonicity. These may reflect changes in household perceptions about what “Internet use” refers to in the survey
(e.g. dial-up versus broadband). There may also have been sampling error that affected smaller counties dispro-
portionately. Classical measurement error would impose attenuation bias on our results, biasing them towards no
effect.
15The supplementary Internet questions appear in the CPS in 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2007.
16The automobile and Internet data sources are described above. The demographic data are obtained from the
U.S. Bureau Census and the Employment Development Department of the State of California. Finally, county-level
gasoline price are from the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS).
8trade as a fraction of total used cars registered declined from 13.5 percent to just below 10 percent
over time.
Importantly for our purposes, the residential penetration of Internet use increased three-fold over
the decade. The most Internet-intense county in 1997 (Orange County) had only 25 percent pene-
tration, far below its 57 percent level in 2007.17 By the end of our sample, 17 counties had achieved
over 45 percent Internet penetration, and only eleven counties were below 35 percent. This decade
also witnessed significant economic growth, population aging, and a doubling in the price of un-
leaded gasoline. Median incomes rose from $37,000 in 1997 to $53,000 (in nominal terms), while
unemployment fell from 9.2 percent to 6.7 percent. The presence of extensive heterogeneity across
counties leads us to include these time-varying county demographics as regressors in our empirical
analysis (in addition to an array of fixed effects).
3 Empirical Approach and Evidence
In the automobile market, replacement decisions are based on depreciation in quality of goods over
time. Each period, consumers assess the quality of the durable good they own. If the gain in utility
from updating their holdings, net of prices, exceeds transaction costs, consumers sell their used
goods in the second-hand market and replace them with durable goods of the preferred quality.
It follows that, in the absence of any market frictions, consumers have no incentive to hold their
durable goods across multiple quality levels. If goods depreciate every period, consumers will never
hold onto their durables for more than one period but will always update to their preferred car
quality.18 Hence, lowering market frictions should induce a high turnover rate. The resale ratio
(i.e. the ratio between number of traded cars and stock for each make-model-year) is a direct
approximation of the magnitude of frictions that prevent consumers from replacing their car every
17The county with the highest Internet penetration in 2007 was Marin at 64 percent.
18See, for example, Hideo and Sandfort, 2002; Rust, 1985; Schiraldi 2010, among others)
9period. In a world without frictions, this ratio should be equal to one.
Conceptually, several potential measures of activity in this setting would shed light on the magni-
tude of transaction costs or search frictions. One could glean a measure of the size of frictions by
looking at how long a car stays on the market before selling. Alternately, if one knew how many
potential buyer and seller meetings occur before closing a sale, one could observe how these quanti-
ties change over time, all else equal, as Internet penetration increases. We pursue a somewhat less
direct approach, but one that is feasible given the available data.
We investigate the role of Internet under the assertion that it alters the search environment in
a meaningful way. We hypothesize that it either reduces cost of search, improves match-specific
quality, improves the symmetry of information, or induces some combination of these effects. In
each case the gains from trade would increase, resulting in higher volume of trade. The potential
mechanisms via which Internet may have this effect are many. Internet may directly match buyer
and seller, and perform the function of market maker. It may also facilitate consumers’ search for a
seller/dealer, of the latter’s search for the former. In this case the transaction does not necessarily
occur online.
The Internet my also help to inform consumers and by so doing potentially reducing information
asymmetry.19 Adverse selection is widely viewed to be an important feature of the used car market,
so it is quite plausible that technological advance in the dissemination of relevant (and previously
one-sided) information would have significant efficiency implications. It has been argued that the
magnitude of search costs in a market is likely to be a function of the market’s “thickness”, and
we will investigate this hypothesis in this study. The idea is that markets with a higher number
of potential buyers and sellers are likely to exhibit higher meeting rates and, correspondingly, a
19Lewis (2011) shows that used-car sellers are able to partially contract on the quality of their goods by disclosing
private information on the webpage, i.e. by posting text, photos, etc. He shows that woluntarily disclosure of private
information on the web helps to protect the buyer from adverse selection.
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higher rate of transactions.20 In our setting, the most direct interpretation would be to view market
thickness in terms of registered cars of a given type. The relationship to market thickness and
Internet use is potentially important for interpreting the mechanism by which Internet improves
market outcomes. For example, were Internet to facilitate an increasing trade ratio of cars at
lower registration counts, that is suggestive of either a decrease in search costs or an increase in
the match-specific quality achieved in the market. At higher registration counts, though, finding
potential matches is likely easier, and thus search costs are likely not as important as match-specific
quality.
In this section we describe several specifications that explore the relationship between Internet use
and volume of trade in the used car market. The first set of specifications examines the overall effect
on volume of trade and resale ratio, and the second set sheds light on the mechanisms by allowing
for effects that differ by market thickness. Finally, we explore the role of level of urbanization and
how the effect of Internet on trade operates differentially in this context. The population density
and level of urbanization analysis lends additional insight into the mechanisms at work, and is also
of direct policy interest.
Note that the predicted effects are general equilibrium in nature, and that supply and demand
curves need not be separately estimated to test the predictions. We concentrate the analysis on
equilibrium volume of trade and resale ratio. Thus, in all specifications below we choose to omit
price as a right-hand-side variable, allowing it to vary on the transition path.
3.1 Volume of Trade
We first test the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, increases in Internet penetration lead to increases
in volume of trade. Support for the hypothesis of interest will be found if higher equilibrium volume
of trade is observed within a county during years of high Internet penetration. The non-random
20See, for example, Gavazza’s (2011) investigation of the commercial aircraft market.
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diffusion of Internet requires us to control for some important potential confounders. Locations
with higher levels of income may have a higher Internet adoption rate, since Internet was a new and
expensive technology during our period of study. Further, the costs of installing and accessing the
network have a high fixed component, which leads us to expect more densely-populated regions to
be serviced first. If income or population density are correlated with used car transaction volume
(and both seem plausible, if not likely), we must control for these variables. It is also possible that
there are other, unobserved variables correlated with both Internet penetration and the number of
used cars traded, that are driving the relationship. Systematic differences in characteristics of the
locations with different levels of Internet penetration and volume of trade will bias the estimates.
In order to deal with these endogeneity concerns, we exploit the panel structure of the data by em-
ploying a difference-in-differences specification. As regressors, we include observable demographics
that vary at the county-year level to address many of the aforementioned endogeneity concerns.
These demographic controls include the average income level in each county, the unemployment
rate, the age distribution in the population, and population level itself. We also include the av-
erage price of gasoline for each county-year combination, thus controlling for the possibility that
changes in fuel price affect the volume of used cars traded and its allocation. The set of control
variables is completed via inclusion of county and time fixed-effects. These control for any residual
time-invariant county unobservables and aggregate shocks that are shared by all locations in a
given year. Identification of the Internet effect is thus achieved from within county variation in
transaction volume and Internet penetration over time.
The baseline relationship between Internet and transaction volume is estimated by the following
equation:
yjct = γ1Internetct + βDct + αc + αt + αj + jct (1)
Subscript c denotes county, t denotes year, and j denotes model type. The dependent variable,
yjct, is the log of the resale ratio: the number of used cars of model j traded at the county level in
each year, divided by the stock of model j cars in that county-year. The coefficient of interest is γ,
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which conveys the conditional effect of Internet on the resale ratio. Depending on the specification,
a variety of model-based fixed effects (αj) are used. Additionally, we include time-varying county
demographic variables (Dct) to control for potentially important confounding variables. In the
specifications shown, we control flexibly for car make, model, and model-year, though both the
qualitative and quantitative results are robust to alternate specifications of car-level controls.21
Traditionally, inference is based on the assumption that the data are independent across c and t.
Each observation is treated as a random draw from the same population, uncorrelated with the
observation before or after. However, this is not always the case, and the most important form of
dependence arises in data with a group structure. For example, time series observations within a
group may exhibit serial correlation. Failure to account for this will cause standard error estimates
to be biased downwards, leading to incorrect inference. To account for these considerations, we
take advantage of the high number of counties (57) which allows us to implement a simple and
widely used approach. In every specification, standard errors are clustered at the county level.
We estimate several OLS specifications of equation (2), using the resale ratio as well as count of
used cars sold by model as the outcome variable of interest.22 Table (2) displays the results, with
the addition of incremental control variables when moving left to right between columns. It is
illuminating to understand how the results change with the addition of these controls. Column 1
shows a baseline regression of used car resale ratios on county Internet penetration, with only car
characteristic controls (which are present throughout). This sparse group of covariates captures
very little of the variation in resale ratio. The effect of interest is not statistically different from
zero, but nonetheless it indicates a positive qualitative relationship between Internet and resale
ratio. For these specifications, the coefficient on Internet should be interpreted as a percentage
point change in the average fraction of used cars transacted in a given year.
Columns 2 through 5 display results that show the importance of including county demographics
21Recall that our identifying variation occurs at the county-year level, so this is not surprising.
22“Model” here is specific to a make and model of a particular vintage (model-year) each year.
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and the cross-section and time fixed effects. They also help to confirm some basic priors about what
affects trade volume. In column 2 we include demographic covariates, but no county or time fixed
effects. The estimated treatment effect increases relative to column 1, but is still insignificant. The
coefficient on income implies that wealthy households hold their cars longer, and that fuel price
increases are associated with fewer transactions.
Columns 3 and 4, which include either year or county fixed effects, should be interpreted relative
to column 5, the specification for which includes both. Column 3 indicates that failing to control
for time-invariant county unobservables biases the treatment effect downwards. Time-invariant
county characteristics may include such variables as sales tax, the rate of which varies by county
in California. Failure to account for this variation biases the estimated effect downwards, which is
the expected direction of bias for a variable such as sales tax (which is negatively correlated with
transaction volume).
Column 4 swaps year fixed effects for county fixed effects, and thus uses across-county variation
within each time period to strip out any unobserved aggregate shocks. Again, comparing it to
the estimates from column 5 provides a natural explanation for the change in treatment estimate.
Using across variation instead of within variation takes out the spurious correlation between Internet
penetration and volume of trade that is due to unobservable aggregate shocks over time. Aggregate
shocks will include macroeconomic shifts, which are likely an important determinant of used car
demand. The Internet coefficient in this specification increases to 0.063, indicating that the inclusion
of aggregate time effects absorbs variation that is positively correlated with transaction volume (e.g.
economic growth). Thus, it appears important to include both of the controls discussed above.
Column 5 is thus our preferred specification. It displays results that control for county, year, and car
fixed effects, in addition to the full array of demographic characteristics. In this specification, when
a county goes from no residential Internet penetration to ubiquitous usage, the resale ratio increases
by 4.4 percentage points, an effect that is significant with 95 percent confidence. We interpret these
results supporting the hypothesis that the Internet improves the search and matching technology
14
in California’s used car market.
To put the magnitude of this effect into perspective, let us examine the used car market in 2007
relative to 1997. The weighted mean county Internet penetration is 43.6 percentage points in 2007,
implying an increase of 28.6 percentage points over this period. The coefficient from column 5 trans-
lates into a 1.9 percentage point rise in the resale ratio (which was 0.174 in 2007) due to Internet.
These estimates suggest a causal effect of Internet which increases the resale ratio by 7.2 percent
relative to 1997 levels. State-wide, this translates into over 120,000 additional transactions per
year relative to what would have occurred in 2007 at 1997-level Internet penetration. As discussed
above a high level of frictions on the secondary market (transaction and search costs, asymmetric
information etc.) reduces the frequency of replacement. Hence the resale ratio approximates the
size of this frictions preventing consumers from replacing their cars in every period.
State-level automobile price data prices offer an estimate of the average transaction costs. As in
Porter and Sattler (1999) and Gavazza et al (2012), the difference between the trade-in value and
the retail price offers an intuitive measure of the cost of two-sided search and matching. In our
data, this difference ranges from $1,607 to $1,837. Under the assumption of a linear relationship
between transaction costs and resale ratio, the shared surplus gain in 2007 due to a 28.6 percentage
point increase in Internet penetration is $25 per car traded. When compared to the counterfactual
of zero Internet, this gain increases to $38. State-wide, the efficiency gain from transaction cost
reduction alone is $43 million annually, or roughly a 2 percent reduction in transaction costs for
1.7 million used cars traded. There are two reasons why this amount represents a lower-bound of
the total welfare gain due to Internet penetration in this market. First, it does not include surplus
generated by the realization of additional transactions (over 120,000 annually). Second, it is likely
that Internet facilitates better sorting and matching between buyers and vehicles, which would lead
to further increases in joint surplus for the entire population of traded vehicles.
15
3.2 Market Thickness and Internet effect
A market with many more used cars for sale will increase the probability for a buyer to find a better
match and, conditional on the matching technology, will increase the number of transactions. We
test for this market thickness effect. In addition, one of the main contributions of this paper is to
explore whether improvements in matching technology have different effects in markets of varying
thickness. That is, does Internet enhance market efficiency more in thin markets or thick markets?
There are competing hypotheses here. In thin markets it may be more difficult for buyers to find
a car that matches their tastes, and the presence of Internet may provide a more efficient search
technology. On the other hand, thick markets may present buyers with choice overload.23 Were
this to be the case, Internet may provide a superior matching technology that enables consumers
to distill a vast number of choices, both increasing the probability of a transaction occurring as
well as improving the quality of the match.
We revisit the specification in equation (2) to examine the role of market thickness. In our context,
market thickness is measured as the number of cars of a given make/model/model-year (e.g. 1997
Honda Accord) registered in a county in a given year. Conditioning on market thickness thus
requires adding the this measure of the vehicle stock as a right-hand side variable. However, we
cannot both do this and use resale ratio as the dependent variable without embedding a structural
endogeneity problem: the stock variable would then appear both in the denominator on the left
hand side as well as on the right hand side as an explanatory variable. There is no valid instrument
to correct such a problem. So, instead we use a slightly different specification that uses the log of
vehicles sold as the dependent variable:
yjct = γ0 lnSjct + γ1Internetct + γ2(lnSjct ∗ Internetct) + βDct + αc + αt + αj + jct (2)
23Consumers facing a large number of alternatives may in fact become less likely to make a purchase than if their
choice set is more limited (Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
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This is similar to equation (2), but with additional regressors to account for the log of stock (Sjct),
and its interaction with Internet penetration rate. The variable Sjct measures the log of vehicle
registration counts for each make/model/model-year available at the beginning of period j in county
c. Its inclusion reflects the fact that, in the used car market, the available stock of each car type is
predetermined.
A somewhat subtle endogeneity concern leads us to pursue an instrumental variable approach to
estimation. Because cars can be traded across the borders, and the stock variable includes the
flows of cars traded, stock is endogenous if time-varying unobservables are correlated over time.
For example, an unobservable demand shock that increases demand for a particular type of car in
county c may lead that car to be imported from nearby counties. This increases the stock and, in
turn, sales of that car in the importing county (c) next period. To address this issue, we use two
different sets of instruments. The first exploits the fact that in aggregate the stock of used cars
cannot increase. With that in mind, we instrument for the stock of model j in county c at time
t using the sum of all type-j cars in California at the time the car was released as a new vehicle
multiplied by the share of the population in county c in 1990.
Supply shifters provide the second set of instruments. These are available due to the fact that
important material inputs to production are traded on large global markets, and the stock of
vehicles today is influenced by production decisions in the past. Hence, we use the interaction
of the price of aluminum in the production year, multiplied by the weight of the car and by the
size of the car, as a plausibly-exogenous supply shifter. Notice that while the input prices do
not themselves vary at the county-year level, their interaction with car characteristics generates
the necessary variation (due to county-year variation in fleet composition). Finally, we use the
exchange rate between the dollar and the currency of the origin countries for the imported cars
(which, again, will vary at the county-year level based on heterogeneity in the composition of the
vehicle fleet between counties). These instruments are jointly significant, and have strength in the
first stage. Table (3) reports the results from a first stage regression and the relative F -test.
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The OLS and 2SLS estimates of Internet on market thickness are displayed In Table (4). There
one can see that (after using IV to correct for endogeneity of the registration count variable) the
elasticity of quantity sold with respect to registration count is greater than one. This implies that
an increase in the vehicle stock more than proportionally increases sales, which is consistent with
the results from Gavazza (2010) even in a market where transactions of used goods are due to
quality depreciation rather than productivity shocks. The significant coefficient on the square of
log-registration also reveals a nonlinear relationship between market thickness and sales.
Our parameters of interest (Internet and Internet interacted with log-registration) reveal a pattern
that supports the hypothesis that consumers in thick markets may be hindered by choice overload.
When Internet enters linearly and without interaction, its coefficient implies a sales elasticity of
approximately 0.23. Thus, a doubling of Internet penetration ought to increase sales by 23 percent.
However, most of this effect is transmitted through an interaction with market thickness. Internet
has an increasing effect on transaction volume at higher levels of registration counts. Notice that
while the coefficient on Internet level term is negative, the effect of Internet at the lowest level of
stock (10 units) is still positive.
3.3 Internet Effects by Population Density and Level of Urbanization
Finally, we investigate the channels through which Internet penetration operate, specifically looking
at the differential effect of Internet across counties with different levels of population density and
urbanization. The idea is that the new technology can have heterogeneous effects in different
environments.
To investigate whether the Internet penetration rate effects urban and rural locations differently,
we use Urban Influence Codes (UIC) created by the Economic Research Service, a division of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The urban influence codes form a classification scheme that dis-
tinguishes metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties by the size of their largest city or town,
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level of urbanization and proximity to other metropolitan and micropolitan counties. Metropoli-
tan counties are further classified as “large” if they have at least 1 million residents and “small”
metropolitan counties have fewer than 1 million (but more than 50,000). “Micropolitan” counties
are an additional classification of urban areas. These are based around a core city or town with a
population of 10,000 to 49,999. California is a state with many highly populated regions, as well
as large areas of agricultural and relatively low-density land. This heterogeneity makes California
an appealing setting in which to examine the differential effect of Internet across areas of differing
population density.
We divide the counties into 2 groups using an aggregated version of UIC: (1) metropolitan counties
and surrounding areas (2) all other counties. We treat 38 counties in our sample as “urban”. These
consist of large and small metropolitan counties and micropolitan adjacent to large metropolitan
counties. The remaining 19 counties are either micropolitan, or small metropolitan counties adja-
cent to a micropolitan county (but not adjacent to a large metropolitan county). Table (5) presents
the results of specifications similar to equation (2), but with an additional urban dummy variable
entering as a control.24 The less-urbanized counties are the reference group in these specifications.
From column 1 we see that urban counties exhibit higher volume of trade than less urban counties,
even after conditioning on all previously-mentioned covariates. Column 2 allows us to quantify any
incremental effect that urban has on the effect of Internet as a facilitator of trade. The coefficient
on Internet interacted with the urban indicator is positive and different from zero with 99 percent
confidence. This result suggests that Internet improves the efficiency of the second-hand market
more in urban and urban-influenced locations than in the more isolated locations. This effect was
previously being subsumed in the Internet-Registration interaction term in Table (4) column 4, the
coefficient on which is two full standard deviations smaller when the urban variables are included.
To put these effects in context, over the decade spanned by our data (and assuming the mean
24In all specifications in Table (5), we once again instrument for the registration count variable as in the specifica-
tions above.
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changes in Internet penetration over those years), urban counties would in 2007 would exhibit 12
percent more used car transactions that their counterparts.25 These findings seems to suggest that
the area’s geographic context has a significant role in amplifying the effect of Internet in improving
market efficiency. Craigslist is an example of this process. In metropolitan areas, the socio-economic
environment allowed for early development of platforms that took advantage of the availability of
Internet technology which facilitates the search process. Craigslist sites were gradually added in
different markets. It was first launched in San Francisco Bay Area in 1995, and then rolled out to
other major cities such as Los Angeles, Sacramento and San Diego before diffusing more broadly
across the State.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we present estimates that quantify the effect that Internet proliferation has had on
the efficiency of the used car market in California. Counties exhibiting large increases in Internet
penetration also show significant increase in volume of trade in the used car market. After control-
ling flexibly for an array of potential confounders including aggregate time-specific effects, time-
invariant county characteristics, and several time-varying county characteristics, a strong, causal
Internet effect remains. On average, Internet increased the resale ratio of used cars in California by
7.2 percent (roughly 120,000 cars annually) in 2007 relative to levels of Internet penetration from
a decade earlier.
We remain intentionally agnostic about the mechanism driving these effects. However, three chan-
nels stand out as plausible explanations: search costs, match quality, and asymmetric information.
It is likely that the cumulative effect that we measure is comprised of a combination of improve-
ments on these dimensions. Given the large degree of heterogeneity in preferences and product
25The change in mean Internet penetration was 27.9 percentage points. Multiplying this by 0.432, the Inter-
net*Urban coefficient from Table (5), implies the 12 percent urban differential.
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attributes, the search and matching process between buyers and sellers is costly. Internet has the
potential to improve market efficiency by reducing the cost of search and by improving the quality
of matches. That Internet provides more benefit (all else equal) in urban areas than rural is in-
triguing. This is consistent with buyers in densely-populated counties facing a very large menu of
choices, where Internet may aid as a screening device.
Another plausible explanation is that Internet helps to eliminate asymmetries in information. Web-
sites such as Carfax.com provide vehicle-specific histories that inform buyers of payoff relevant past
events that have traditionally only been available to the sellers (e.g. accident reports and main-
tenance records). Sellers also voluntary disclose private information online (for example, via text
or photos, as described in Lewis 2011). Whether due to the presence of third-parties or direct
sharing of information between buyers and sellers, the Internet has virtually equalized access to
information. It is thus likely that a substantial portion of our estimated effects are from a decrease
in the adverse selection problem.
The magnitude of the estimated efficiency gains due to decreased frictions are substantial. Joint
surplus increases in 2007 by $25 per unit traded as compared to 1997, and the state-wide gain is
on the order of $ 43 million annually. If similar efficiency benefits were to accrue to other sectors
of the economy, the overall efficiency gains from Internet would be even larger.
The benefits described above are likely to be largely external to the households that purchase
Internet access, and thus a case for policy intervention naturally follows. In the case of search and
matching, it is well-known that many of the benefits are general equilibrium in nature – largely in the
form of inducing a higher number of participants to enter as buyers and sellers. Already, subsidies
for broadband Internet deployment are hotly debated. This is particularly true of subsidies for
rural areas. To the extent that external benefits are incorporated into the cost-benefit calculation,
our study implies that the marginal subsidy may produce larger efficiency gains in urban areas.
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Table 2: Internet on Resale Ratio
Resale Ratio
1 2 3 4 5
Internet 0.024 0.036 0.027     0.063**     0.044** 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.040) (0.026) (0.018)
ln(Population)             -0.003    -0.008*     -0.105**    -0.109** 
            (0.003) (0.004) (0.050) (0.049)
Median Income                -0.063**    -0.047*  -0.012 -0.021
            (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.042)
Mean Unemployment             0.000 -0.001    -0.001*  -0.001
            (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average Age Head-of-HH             -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
            (0.001) (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Fuel Price                -0.042***    -0.165***    -0.033*** -0.09
            (0.006) (0.058) (0.005) (0.081)
County F.E. No No No Yes Yes
Year F.E. No No Yes No Yes
Make/Model/Age/Modelyr F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 213,700 213,700 213,700 213,700 213,700
R-Square 0.001 0.159 0.167 0.231 0.232
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. * Significant at the 0.10 level, ** 
Significant at the 0.05 level, *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 3: 1st Stage of 2SLS IV
Registration 
Counts
(Registration 
Counts)^2
    0.613***    -0.257***
(0.002) (0.010)
0.006     0.200***
(0.004) (0.023)
   -0.063***    -1.256***
(0.014) (0.088)
    0.041***     0.986***
(0.000) (0.001)
   -0.042***     0.070** 
(0.005) (0.031)
   -0.002***    -0.033***
(0.000) (0.003)
N 478,940 478,940
R-Square 0.866 0.917
Exchange Rate
Suare of (Log Cumulative Stock of each 
make/model x Share of Population of Counties 
Square of (Price Aluminium *Weight)
Square of (Exchange Rate)
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 0.10 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, *** 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Log Cumulative Stock of each make/model x 
Share of Population of Counties (1990)
Price Aluminium *Weight
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Table 4: Internet on Market Thickness
ln(Quantity Sold)
1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
ln(Registration)     0.855***     1.122***     0.824***     1.073***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.025) (0.032)
ln(Registration)^2     0.009***    -0.007**     0.009***    -0.007** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Internet     0.227**     0.236** -0.158    -0.379***
(0.094) (0.099) (0.105) (0.112)
Internet*ln(Registration)                             0.110***     0.172***
                        (0.027) (0.024)
ln(Population)    -0.323*     -0.438** -0.303    -0.406** 
(0.187) (0.201) (0.187) (0.200)
Income -0.328 -0.314    -0.404**    -0.435** 
(0.205) (0.214) (0.203) (0.210)
Unemployment -0.008 -0.005    -0.011**    -0.010*  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Average Age Head-of-HH -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fuel Price    -0.454*     -0.458*     -0.652**    -0.769***
(0.266) (0.263) (0.260) (0.243)
County F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Make/Model/Age/Modelyr F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 180,376 180,376 180,376 180,376
R-Square 0.870 0.867 0.870 0.867
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. * Significant at the 0.10 level, ** 
Significant at the 0.05 level, *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
28
Table 5: Internet on Urban/Rural
ln(Quantity Sold) w/ Urban Split
1 2
IV IV
ln(Registration)     1.073***     1.081***
(0.032) (0.033)
ln(Registration)^2    -0.007**    -0.007** 
(0.003) (0.003)
Internet    -0.379***    -0.650***
(0.112) (0.108)
Internet*ln(Registration)     0.151***     0.126***
(0.027) (0.026)
Urban     1.400**     1.461** 
(0.625) (0.640)
Internet*Urban     0.432***
(0.125)
ln(Population)    -0.406**    -0.458** 
(0.200) (0.211)
Income    -0.435**    -0.539***
(0.210) (0.201)
Unemployment    -0.010*     -0.011** 
(0.005) (0.005)
Average Age Head-of-HH -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Fuel Price -0.367 -0.352
(0.283) (0.278)
County F.E. Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes
Make/Model/Age/Modelyr F.E. Yes Yes
N 180,376 180,376
R-Square 0.867 0.867
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. * Significant at 
the 0.10 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6: Implied Increase in Joint Surplus
Supply Elasticity
Demand Elasticity 5 4 3 2 1
-5 213 240 284 373 640
-4 240 267 311 400 666
-3 284 311 355 444 711
-2 373 400 444 533 800
-1 640 666 711 800 1,066
Increase in joint surplus per used car traded associated with an increase in volume of trade of 100,000. 
Calculated at the 2007 California average used car price of $7,508 for a range of demand and supply 
elasticities.
Table 7: Annual Welfare Gain
Supply Elasticity
Demand Elasticity 5 4 3 2 1
-5 10,661,360 11,994,030 14,215,147 18,657,380 31,984,080
-4 11,994,030 13,326,700 15,547,817 19,990,050 33,316,750
-3 14,215,147 15,547,817 17,768,933 22,211,167 35,537,867
-2 18,657,380 19,990,050 22,211,167 26,653,400 39,980,100
-1 31,984,080 33,316,750 35,537,867 39,980,100 53,306,800
Annual welfare gain associated with an increase in volume of trade of 100,000. Calculated at the 2007 
California average used car price of $7,508 and a range of demand and supply elasticities.
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Figure 1: Internet Penetration by County, 1997-2007
